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2 Minute Drill

Institutionalized Incompetence | 2 Minute Drill with Drex DeFord

5:54

with Drex DeFord

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About this episode

Workday, Microsoft, the FAA, Chase, the NSA, Apple: a string of outages and downtime that, we're told, aren't connected. Cybersecurity folks worry about a coordinated attack, a nation state, or a compromised supplier. Drex asks a different question: what if the common denominator is institutionalized incompetence? Not incompetent people, but organizations, healthcare included, that have built up an immunity to good judgment: an unwillingness to prioritize, understand risk, invest, confront technical debt, make hard decisions, or learn. Risk gets documented, discussed, accepted, and eventually stops feeling like a risk, and then something breaks and we spend far more responding than preventing. A system that hasn't failed isn't necessarily resilient; it may just be lucky. In healthcare, where failures reach patients and families, how much of what's happening to us comes from decisions we made, deferred, or avoided? It's fixable, if leadership wants to fix it.

Thanks to Zscaler Healthcare for sponsoring today's show. Drop Drex a note at drex@229project.com.

Remember, Stay a Little Paranoid.

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Transcript

Hey everyone, I'm Drex, and this is the Two Minute Drill. Thanks to Zscaler Healthcare for sponsoring today's show. It's great to see you today. Here's some stuff you might wanna know about.

So today, I wanna give you some thoughts on the collection of stories that everyone seems to be talking about right now. This weird series of what is apparently a bunch of down times and outages that are not connected, at least that's what we're being told. Starting even back in October with Black October, all those issues seem to have popped up almost daily. Last week it was Workday, Microsoft on Friday, the FAA outages. This week it's Chase, and then the NSA, and then Apple, even Nvidia's announcement last week. All of that is just kind of contributed to this weirdness.

And I think the folks who work in cybersecurity, we start worrying about whether or not there's a connection. Like is there a coordinated attack or a nation state operation or a compromised technology supplier? And from what we're being told, it's none of that.

What if the common denominator is something else? And this is the thing I've talked about over and over and over again over the past few years. And it's a popular theory with some people, and it's a little too close to home for others. What if the problem is institutionalized incompetence?

Now I'm not talking about incompetent people. I've spent a lot of my career working alongside very competent, very talented tech professionals who understand the problems that they see and how to fix them, but they're really frustrated by their inability to make those fixes a reality. The idea of institutionalized incompetence comes from my experience that I think a lot of our organizations kind of across the board, healthcare and otherwise, have developed an almost organizational immunity to good judgment. And it happens over time.

We've made it a feature of our organization's culture, stuff like this, an unwillingness to prioritize. If everything's a priority, that means nothing is a priority. An unwillingness to understand risk. We've turned risk management into a documentation exercise instead of a decision-making discipline. An unwillingness to invest. Resilience is an expense right up until the moment it becomes the thing that saves our operations. An unwillingness to confront technical debt. Almost every leadership team kicks the can down the road leaving the next leadership team with a slightly bigger can because fixing tech debt isn't fun or cool or sexy. An unwillingness to make difficult decisions. Committees and governance structures and approval processes. Those have become mechanisms for distributing accountability rather than leaders exercising real leadership. And an unwillingness to learn. We conduct root cause analysis and we write reports and then we move on and we fix the technology but we don't always fix the institutional behaviors that contributed to the failure in the first place.

And perhaps most concerning, we have an unwillingness to distinguish between the absence of failure and the presence of resilience. A system that hasn't failed isn't necessarily a resilient system, it's just a system that might be lucky.

I've sat in enough executive meetings to have a good idea of how this happens. A risk is identified, it's discussed, it's documented, it goes through a bunch of committees and the risk is accepted. And eventually everyone becomes so comfortable with that risk's existence that it stops feeling like a risk at all. We've institutionalized the acceptance of unacceptable risk and that might be in a nutshell the whole idea that is institutionalized incompetence. Then something breaks, everyone's surprised. Emergency funding comes available, executives demand answers and we spend way more money and goodwill responding to the failure than we would have probably spent just preventing it in the first place.

So right now at the present, there's no established connections between all these recent outages, including the ones that are happening at your own organization. You know the ones I'm talking about, the ones that haven't made the headlines.

But that leads me to this question. In healthcare specifically, where the consequences of these kinds of technology failures can extend well beyond financial impacts and reputational damage to our patients and families and their lives, how much of what's happening to us comes from institutionalized incompetence? How much of our tech failures are the product of decisions that we've made or decisions that we've deferred or decisions that we've deliberately avoided? We spend an enormous amount of time worrying about the sophistication of our competitors and that can be bad guys or competitors in the market or vendors, whatever the case may be. Maybe we should spend more time worrying about the sophistication or the lack of sophistication in our own organizations.

Because if you really dig into the root cause of a lot of these problems, I think it might turn out to be the problem is built in. It's leadership's unwillingness to do the right thing. It's institutionalized incompetence.

But it's fixable. You just have to wanna fix it.

That's it for today's Two Minute Drill. Thanks again to Zscaler Healthcare for sponsoring today's podcast. Drop a note, let me know what you're thinking. I'm always happy to hear from you. I'm Drex at 229project.com. Thanks for being here. Stay a little paranoid and I will see you around campus.